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EXPLORING THE MYSTERIES: CAN WE EVER
KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT RACE AND TAX?
BEVERLY I. MORAN*
In A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,' Bill Whitford
and I studied four important applications of the individual income
tax: to income from wealth, to the expenses of home ownership, to
income in the form of employee benefits, and to marriage.2 With
respect to those applications we compared similarly situated blacks
and whites, as defined by standard socio-economic characteristics, 3 in
order to determine which group benefited more from what we called
"tax benefits." 4 Along with Congress and the majority of the tax
academy, we used the comprehensive income tax ideal to define what
we meant by a "tax benefit." If you read A Black Critique of the
Internal Revenue Code, I believe you will be convinced that: (1) race
has important Code effects; and (2) there are legitimate ways to
demonstrate those effects.
I. INFLUENCING THE CODE: THE BLACK CONGRESS METAPHOR
At its most basic level, asking whether the Code has race effects
is asking whether groups can influence the Code. That some groups
and individuals have that power is, I think, generally accepted One
step up from knowing that influence can shape Code provisions is
asking how influence might work. To illustrate how race might affect
© 1998 Beverly I. Moran.
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. Visiting Fulbright Professor of Law,
University of Asmara, 1996-98. I would like to thank Professor William Whitford for his
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751.
2. See id. at 755.
3. See id. at 818-20.
4. See id. at 751-55.
5. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GuCcI
GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM
(1987); see also Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing
Well?: Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891 (1987)
(reviewing BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra); Lawrence Zelenak, Are Rifle Shot Transition
Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REv. 563, 564-65
(1989) (discussing the Louis B. Mayer amendment that saved $2 million in taxes).
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Code applications, Bill Whitford and I created a thought experiment
we called the "Black Congress."
Is it possible that a Congress made up primarily of one type of
person might create legislation that favored that type over others? If
we looked at a Congress made up of Ku Klux Klan members, would
anyone doubt that tax legislation might look different from our
present regime? Would a Gay Congress or a Female Congress make
different choices? There is certainly scholarship that suggests these
differences.6
We have just engaged in a thought experiment. Thought
experiments are a valued method in both legal and non-legal
philosophy.7 To illustrate how the Code might impact blacks and
whites differently, we imagined a Black Congress-a Congress made
up solely of blacks and focusing solely on the self-interest of blacks as
a group-and asked what tax provisions it might enact. We guessed
that a Black Congress would enact some substantially different rules
in the areas we studied, rules that favored lifestyle characteristics of
blacks as opposed to whites or other ethnic groups.
II. INTENT VERSUS EFFECr
The Black Congress metaphor illustrates how differentiation by
race in the application of Code provisions is possible even in the
absence of any conscious, or even unconscious, desire to create a
race-biased Code. My point is that legislators who share the same
background might create codes that favored their group without
necessarily having any conscious, or even unconscious, ill will. This
favoritism is possible because in America race carries with it more
than color.8
One way that race carries more than color is how race shapes
6. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 LAW &
SEXUALITY 97 (1991); David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of
Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447
(1996).
7. See, e.g., JOHN RAVLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (using a thought
experiment to determine principles of justice by asking what principles would be agreed
upon by persons in a hypothetical position of equality, with limited knowledge about their
real life situation).
8. To say that race carries with it more than color is saying less than we already
know from life in America. For example, we already know that race is so powerful that it
can even operate in the absence of color. This is the import of Judy Scales-Trent's and
Greg Williams's works on their lives as "white" black people in America. See JUDY
SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY
(1995); GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY
OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995).
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people's lifestyles over generations. Not only do these lifestyles go
beyond color, they go beyond money and other significant class
markers.9 In fact, what social science tells us is that blacks and whites
lead lives so different that race shapes where they live, what they
learn, and what they own. Another result of race in America is social
isolation so that each group knows little or nothing about the other.
These two factors taken together, social isolation and social
difference, mean that the decisionmaking group can act to further
causes that it truly believes are in everyone's best interest while in
fact favoring its group over others. This is why we can see race
effects without intent. The rule itself is intended, but the hidden race
effect is not. Further, because the Code itself is so complex and
layered, the disadvantaged group may have no idea that it is being ill
treated.'? After all, even Supreme Court Justices admit to finding
taxation a baffling affair."
III. SELECrING A BASELINE
Any discussion of discrimination in the Internal Revenue Code
presumes that we can know a non-discriminatory Code when we see
one. We used the comprehensive income tax ideal as our definition
of a non-discriminatory Code.
The comprehensive income tax ideal has a special place in tax
scholarship. For example, the tax expenditure budget that Congress
uses to estimate the cost of tax benefits is based on an ideal
comprehensive income tax. 2 We mimicked the tax expenditure
budget by defining tax benefits as any deduction or exclusion from
income that is inconsistent with the comprehensive income tax
ideal. 3 In this regard, we follow traditional tax policy analysis.
9. As we show in our review of the social science literature on race differences and
wealth, the gap between blacks and whites on such standard matters as home ownership
and savings is highly influenced by race even when people of the same age, marital status,
education level, number of children, region, and area type are compared. See Moran &
Whitford, supra note 1, at 818-20.
10. This tendency to favor white lifestyles exists even when black ways of living are
arguably better than their white counterparts (for example, the rules that penalize black
working wives who raise their families into higher and higher levels of the middle class).
See id. at 795.
11. See Beverly I. Moran & Daniel M. Schneider, The Elephant and the Four Blind
Men: The Burger Court and Its Federal Tax Decisions, 39 HoW. L.J. 841,857 (1996).
12. See Tax Expenditures Chapter from the President's Fiscal 1998 Budget, 74 TAX
NOTES 915, 930 (1997).
13. Under an ideal comprehensive income tax system, all income is taxed at some
point. Further, this tax event should occur sooner rather than later. See Beverly I.
Moran, One Tax Piece of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Can the Federal Home Loan Bank
1998] 1631
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IV. USING CONTROLS
Our objective was to test whether the Code taxed blacks and
whites, as groups, differently. To do this, we could not simply
compare the per capita tax liabilities of blacks with whites. The
Internal Revenue Code is intentionally structured to differentiate
between economic classes. That is the very nature of vertical equity.
Accordingly, differences across class boundaries show a Code
intent. 4
To test our hypothesis, therefore, we needed to compare blacks
and whites who should, according to the comprehensive income tax
ideal, be taxed similarly. Because we could demonstrate that blacks
and whites who are similar by the tenets of that ideal are not taxed
similarly, we concluded that the Code treats taxpayers differently by
race. Because blacks and whites, as groups, have different lifestyles,
they receive both different tax benefits and different tax liabilities.
Considerations other than income and race can account for
lifestyle differences. It is possible that some other factors (for
example, average age, since blacks have a lower life expectancy)
account for the racial differentials in tax liability that we observed.
One of the most difficult methodological questions we faced was
what factors other than income and race to use as controls (that is,
independent variables) in our regression equations for ascertaining
the determinants of differential tax liability. Both the text and our
Board Use the Internal Revenue Code to Bail Out the Ailing Savings and Loan Industry?,
22 U. TOL. L. REv. 351, 359-67 (1991). Thus, for example, under a comprehensive
income tax, increased net worth from both gifts and labor each would get taxed upon
receipt. Further, under an ideal comprehensive income tax, many deductions would drop
out of our present tax system altogether because those deductions are not needed to
determine income. For example, when I buy stock for $1200 and sell it for $1500, my
income is only $300. In order to make this calculation work, we subtract out the $1200
original investment. We need this deduction in a comprehensive income tax in order to
determine that taxable income is $300 and not $1500. On the other hand, under a
comprehensive income tax ideal there is no need to deduct much (perhaps all) home
mortgage interest in order to determine income (some home mortgage interest could be
considered an investment expense, not a consumption expense). The home mortgage
interest deduction is a benefit to people operating under a comprehensive income tax
because it is a type of income that is exempted from taxation even though its removal is
not needed to determine the "proper" tax base. See generally Glen Arlen Kohl, The
Identification Theory of Basis, 40 TAX L. REV. 623 (1985) (articulating a theory for
determining the tax base).
14. The principle of vertical equity mandates that there should be appropriate
differentiation between persons on each income level and those of the levels above and
below. The principle prescribes only that there be some differentiation between each
group and the next higher and lower groups, and does not specify the amount of
differentiation. See 1 BORIS I. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCoME, ESTATES AND GiFrs 3.1.4 (2d ed. 1989).
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methodological appendix contained extensive discussion of this
issue." In the end, we decided to control for education, spouse's
income, region, age, marital status, area type, employment, children,
and age of children, in addition to race and income. 6 Even after
controlling for all these variables, we found that race yeas a
statistically significant determinant of tax liability with respect to the
categories of Code applications we studied.'7
V. CONSTRUCTED PROFILES VERSUS ACrUAL RETURN DATA
Having selected a baseline and controls, the next question we
had to face was what databases to use for determining the tax
liabilities of blacks and whites. Many studies of the differential tax
liability of different groups use actual return data, and there are
many advantages to this approach. The greatest unknown for any
Code is not what it says but how it works. If people do not take
advantage of rules, or if they cheat away at the rules, then just
studying the written rule without also asking about the applied rule is
problematic.
However, a study that measures compliance in addition to tax
liability requires either race-coded returns or sophisticated taxpayer
surveys. Tax returns are not race-coded and there are no compliance
studies by race that address the questions we raise in A Black
Critique of the Internal Revenue Code. Although tax returns are not
coded by race, they can be cross-matched by race through Social
Security numbers. However, cross-matching against Social Security
numbers requires security clearance.
Without access to actual returns, we were forced to draw our
samples from a variety of general population databases that describe
life decisions by blacks and whites.8 From this information, we
15. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 756-58, 818-20.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 799-800.
18. The databases used in the data analysis included the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, which was designed to track entry into and exit from the
participation in various government-funded social programs. See Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), 1991 Panel, Wave2 Core Microdata File, U.S. Bureau of
the Census (1992). We also have drawn on data from the National Survey of Families and
Households, a survey about work patterns and income resources, home ownership,
inheritance, and gifts. See James A. Sweet & Larry L. Bumpass, The National Survey of
Families and Households-Waves I and 2: Data Description and Documentation, Center
for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin-Madison (last modified Mar. 21,
1998) <http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh>. We used the U.S. Census May 1988 Current
Population Survey of Employee Benefits to study race differences in employee benefit
plan participation and the 1980 Census, PUMS Couples File to study the income of
1998] 1633
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constructed tax liabilities for these groups with respect to the areas of
Code application we studied.
Our analysis assumed that all taxpayers took equal advantage of
tax benefits available to them. There are some advantages to this
approach. A finding of differentials in actual tax liabilities reported
by similarly situated blacks and whites could suggest the need for
more taxpayer education in some communities, or perhaps simpler
forms. A study that looks only at the opportunity to claim tax
benefits, as ours did, isolates the rule itself and exposes underlying
inequity that cannot be remedied by education alone.
In addition, it would be useful to know what racial disparities
exist in the actual enjoyment of tax benefits. Because such a study is
best done by using Social Security records to determine the race of
actual taxpayers, and because use of these records raises privacy
concerns, government is best situated to do that study. I therefore
call for Congress to require an annual "Race Expenditure Budget."
The Race Expenditure Budget would parallel the annual Tax
Expenditure Budget that Congress has required since 1974.
Congressmen and tax scholars use the Tax Expenditure Budget to
estimate government losses from tax benefits. Congress should
create a Race Expenditure Budget and use it in the same way that it
uses the Tax Expenditure Budget. As we stated in our article:
"Ignoring the impact that the Internal Revenue Code has on black
welfare is a tradition that must stop. " 19
VI. Is IT NECESSARILY TRUE THAT A CONSUMPTION TAX IDEAL
FAVORS WHITES OVER BLACKS?
We based our earlier study exclusively on the comprehensive
income tax ideal because it remains the focus of most tax research
and because we lacked resources to extend the study further.
However, there are competing views of what constitutes an ideal
federal income tax. One strong attack on the comprehensive income
tax comes from consumption tax advocates. 20 In contrast to the
comprehensive income tax, under a consumption tax a receipt is only
couples and to ascertain the likelihood of receiving a marriage bonus or penalty. See
Census of Population and Housing, 1980, Public-Use Microdata Sample, Samples A, B,
and C, Couples File, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1983).
19. Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 803.
20. For an extensive discussion on this issue, see William D. Andrews, A
Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974),
and William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: Reply to Professor
Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975).
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taxed when it is consumed.2' If a Code provision is measured against
a consumption (rather than a comprehensive income) tax ideal, there
is a different conclusion about what is a tax benefit.
Professor Zelenak believes that a study that measured the
Internal Revenue Code against a consumption tax ideal would almost
certainly show that the present income tax favors blacks over
whites? 2 His argument appears to be that: (1) the present hybrid
income/consumption tax has more income than consumption
features; (2) the predominance of income tax features within the
present Code means that people with investments will always do
better under a pure consumption tax; (3) whites have more
investments than blacks; and (4) therefore, the present Code is
skewed against whites and in favor of blacks.
If we compare whites in gross numbers to blacks in gross
numbers, whites will almost always outnumber blacks. This is true
whether we are looking at welfare or at memberships on corporate
boards. There are simply many more whites than blacks in America.
It is also true that whites own more property than blacks. We
spent a great deal of time on this proposition when we studied the tax
consequences of investment income in A Black Critique of the
Internal Revenue Code-3 As a consequence, more whites than blacks
undoubtedly would benefit from a switch to a pure consumption tax
system.
In our study, however, we did not limit ourselves to comparing
blacks and whites by gross numbers. Instead, we compared blacks
and whites who shared the same income-that is, who were similarly
situated with respect to the comprehensive income tax ideal. We
saw, for example, not only that the capital gains tax benefit (as
measured by the comprehensive income tax ideal) favors whites over
blacks because more whites own property in gross numbers than
blacks, but also that the capital gains tax benefit favored whites in
comparison to blacks with the same income because blacks and
whites with similar incomes have different- rates of investment in
21. Thus, if I buy stock for $1200, sell it for $1500, and reinvest $1600, I do not have
income because I am not consuming; I am investing. When I sell the $1600 stock and use
the money for a vacation, then I have income. For a discussion of the role of realization
under a comprehensive income tax, see Moran, supra note 13, at 359-63.
22. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1521, 1565 (1998).
23. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 763-69; see also MELVIN L. OLIVER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHIWHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECrIVE ON
RACE INEQUALrrY 97-100 (1995) (observing that whites own more property than do
blacks).
1998] 1635
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items that produce capital gains.24
Finding that similarly situated blacks and whites have different
tax results is much more significant than a finding that blacks or
whites benefit in gross, because different tax results among people
with equal incomes implicate the basic normative principle of
horizontal equity, so central to decades of tax policy analysis. Only
Professor Zelenak believes that blacks and whites should be taxed
the same on a per capita basis. It is blacks and whites who are
similarly situated, as measured either by a comprehensive income tax
or consumption tax ideal, who should be taxed similarly.
VII. CONTROLS AND ASSET COMPOSITION
In order to test the Code against a consumption tax ideal and
still get the same depth of analysis that we achieved when using a
comprehensive income tax ideal, we would have to use data that
measure "taxable consumption." Only then could we compare
similarly situated blacks and whites against a consumption tax ideal.
This is a difficult task because the consumption tax includes in its
base such items as loan proceeds used for consumption, and this
information is not readily available by race32
Assuming it is possible to develop controls for testing the Code
against a consumption tax ideal, it is simply not clear how blacks and
whites would fare under that ideal in comparison to one another.
The uncertainty results from asset composition, a concept we treat in
depth in A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code.26 We can see
how asset composition affects the analysis by looking at the
treatment of borrowing against homes for consumption versus
investing in interest-bearing accounts.
The Internal Revenue Code does not include the proceeds from
home equity loans in the tax base,27 although a tax would occur under
an ideal consumption tax if the monies are used for non-investment
purposes. Further, the present Code permits an interest deduction
24. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 769-71. As explained above, we also
controlled for such non-income considerations as education, region of country, marital
status, and age to guard against the possibility that these factors, rather than race,
accounted for the black/white differences we observed in the enjoyment of capital gains
tax benefits. See supra text accompanying note 16.
25. See supra note 18 (discussing the databases used to develop income controls).
Large databases such as these are much more likely to include information about total
income than total expenditures.
26. See Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 769-71.
27. See Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 722,788 (1990).
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on home equity loans even if used for consumption expenditures.0
These Code features are tax benefits under the consumption tax
ideal. Conversely, the receipt of interest income that is held for
investment is excluded under the consumption tax ideal. Yet interest
income is generally taxed under our present Code.
Data reported in A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code
suggest that, although whites have more interest-bearing investments
than blacks, a higher percentage of total investments by blacks are in
interest-bearing accounts 9.2  Although there is reason to believe that
a higher percentage of black wealth than white wealth is invested in
housing, it is indisputable that on average blacks have less equity in
housing than whites, and black houses appreciate more slowly than
white houses.3 Having more capital investments creates a greater
opportunity to borrow against those investments and spend the loan
proceeds on consumption.
From this limited information alone, no conclusion can be
reached about whether blacks would benefit or suffer, as compared
with similarly situated whites, from a switch to an ideal consumption
tax. However, reflection on the data about asset composition that we
reported in our article makes us much less certain about the outcome
of a competent study than Professor Zelenak is.
VIII. NONE OF THIS IS SURPRISING
The thing that is the most surprising about this entire
Symposium is that there is a symposium at all. Many of the matters
discussed in A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code and the
other articles highlighted here are obvious. Our tax system does
more than tax revenues. It also tries to shape, punish, and reward
behaviors. The Code is subject to influence. Blacks and whites know
very little about one another, and whites essentially hold the power
to tax. What would make any one of us think that the Code would
not have rules that favored whites over blacks?
What is surprising is the resistance to such an obvious
observation. This is especially true when the work was done with the
standard of care and depth that we exhibited.
In a sense, the very reactions we received confirm our
speculations about race in America. Black audiences who have
28. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (West Supp. 1998).
29. This fact is the most reasonable inference to draw from the data reported in
Moran & Whitford, supra note 1, at 766 tbl.1.
30. See i at 777-78 (citing and discussing the most relevant study on this topic).
1998] 1637
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listened to my marriage penalty analysis since 1991 have always
immediately understood the point. It was very much akin to the
"click" idea introduced by Ms. magazine. 1 Whites, on the other
hand, tend to find the entire idea baffling and off-putting. What is
going on when legal academics have such a huge experience gap that
they exhibit such different reactions?
Once again we are comparing people who are the same as
defined by a group of socio-economic characteristics. Law professors
have more such characteristics in common than more randomly
selected groups. Thus, this furor over something that blacks within
the group find obvious is a bad sign. Such a wide gap in how we view
race in such a finely matched group says more about race in America
than a hundred studies. Nevertheless, I think that another study is
clearly in order.
In my next study, I will look at several benefits that are tied to
low incomes-for example, the earned income credit, old age
benefits, and welfare benefits. Obviously these are areas where we
would expect more black access to tax benefits. In addition,
assuming that I can locate databases that will permit me to design
relevant controls, I will define "tax benefits" using both a
consumption and a comprehensive income tax ideal. I cannot give
results yet, but I suspect that what I find will be interesting.
31. See Jane O'Reilly, The Housewife's Moment of Truth, Ms., Spring 1972, at 54
(coining the term "Click" to name those moments in life when a notion crystallizes in a
flash of truth); see also Jane O'Reilly, A Global Click!, Ms., July-Aug. 1987, at 60
(referring to her coining of the term).
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